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Abstract—Anonymous network provides user privacy to 
protect identity. The onion routing (TOR) project is one kind of 
Internet anonymous networks which attracts many researchers 
and clients nowadays, because of its simplicity and scalability. 
However, there are some difficulties to analyze TOR 
performance within live TOR networks since it is distributed and 
its security nature. This paper presents a TOR network 
simulation using shadow-plugin-TOR to configure a small scale 
virtual computer network within a host, running TOR, and then 
to analyze TOR performance in several measurements. One main 
advantage is that the shadow-plugin-TOR application can be 
implemented within a host in which used to build a client-server 
architecture of TOR network. Various number of relays and 
clients have been set to examine TOR network performance. The 
small scale simulations conducted using maximal CPU capacity 
between 60%–75% and memory (RAM) usage between 320 MiB–
1.5 GiB for each configuration. The simulation results show that 
average transmission time is shortened and bandwidth is faster 
along with increasing number of relay rather than adding more 
client. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years there have been increasing number of 
electronic transactions all over Internet, mainly using web e-
commerce. The phenomena supported with the ubiquitous of 
mobile digital devices, e.g., smartphone and laptop. Two main 
advantages of electronic transactions are simplified process and 
shorten time response, almost no queueing, compared to 
conventional transactions. In contrast, there are several risks of 
using electronic transactions such as virus, malware, lost data 
packet, and eavesdropping by unauthorized third party. 
Internet, particularly TCP/IP, was not designed with 
anonymity at first. A solution for providing anonymity is to 
create overlay network which runs over TCP/IP network. Then 
the overlay network provides message routing control, hence 
concealing hosts’ IP addresses. This control brings through IP 
address obfuscation, and thus enables anonymity. 
Anonymous network is one kind of data privacy protection 
schemes where both parties of a transaction are unable to 
resolve each other. In other words, the sender is undetected or 
unknown. Two main criteria of an anonymous network are user 
access cannot be traced and user activities are hidden during 
network activity. However, data sent still can be traced back to 
its sender. 
One of widely used anonymous network applications is the 
onion routing (TOR) browser developed by TOR project [1], 
[2]. TOR is a distributed system using low latency network, 
adding extra encryption layer per network hop, and creating 
random network paths for each transaction. The client and 
server paths cannot be traced without traffic analysis. There is 
not exist a node on the communication path which can resolve 
messages sent by client to those received by server. Still many 
researchers find it is complicated to examine how TOR works, 
because of its security features enabled. 
Several researches has been conducted to modeling TOR 
network. Since a live TOR experimentation is difficult, because 
it is not a predictable and controllable environment. There are 
variety of network conditions which may result in bias, hence it 
is troubled to repeat the experiments. In addition, collecting 
client data is inconvenient because it can expose privacy risks. 
Alternative approaches then emerged, such as utilization of 
virtual networks, e.g., using emulation [3] and simulation [4]. 
This paper proposes a complete model of TOR simulation 
and another novel TOR network measurement. This article is 
structured as follow, section I provides background literature in 
anonymous networks, specifically TOR. Section II explains 
how TOR works in details. Section III describes experiment 
setup and running a TOR simulation in virtual network using 
shadow-plugin-TOR to evaluate TOR process and 
performance. Section IV presents experimental results with 
varying number of relays and clients within TOR network 
simulations. Section V gives discussion and analysis of 
experimental results. Last, section VI concludes the results. 
II. THE ONION ROUTING 
A. Onion Routing 
Onion routing is a kind of anonymous network with several 
encryption layers stacked. The layers are peeled one by one to 
get the original data. Each layer consists information about 
only one single next destination address in networks hop. 
Generally, onion routing has three stages [1], i.e. connection 
setup, data movement, and connection tear-down. 
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TOR is responsible for creating communication paths 
between sender and receiver. The first stage of onion routing is 
connection setup in which information distributed to each relay 
within server coverage. Each relay acquired decryption keys 
for each onion routing layer. The second stage is data 
movement where data sent from both client and server using 
algorithms and keys defined earlier. The third stage is 
connection tear-down to close down the onion routing network 
among relays or between both relay endpoints from data 
transmission when needed. 
As an application of TOR, generally TOR browser is used 
to resolve three main issues of privacy protection within a 
computer network, i.e. to prevent user location tracking from 
web sites, servers, or other services; to avoid data transmission 
tracking or eavesdropping by unauthorized third party or 
internet service provider (ISP); and to stave off each relay from 
extracting information about sender and receiver, except for its 
hop network only. Privacy protection scheme using TOR is 
illustrated in Fig. 1. 
 
Fig. 1. Privacy protection in TOR networks. 
Each relay in TOR networks has two keys, a long-term key, 
named identity key, and a short-term key, called onion key. 
Identity key is used to sign digital certificate made by an 
authority, relay descripTOR documents, and direcTORy. 
Meanwhile, onion key is used to decrypt network path finding 
within client request [1], [4]. 
 
Fig. 2. The guard, middle, and exit relays (nodes) within TOR networks. 
TOR user installs an onion proxy (OP) application to 
handle connection setup and routing through TOR network. OP 
retrieves a consensus from a directory server. Consensus 
consists of a list of available TOR nodes, also known as relays 
or onion routers, which created hourly. OP then randomly 
selects three node, called a circuit as shown in Fig. 2, i.e. entry 
or guard node, middle node and exit node. 
Similarly in TOR simulations, DirecTORy authorities send 
consensus documents to clients. The documents created and 
agreed by all direcTORy authorities. There are nine direcTORy 
authorities in TOR project, listed in TOR project web site [2]. 
Each TOR relay connecting to direcTORy authority to receive 
flags that used to create consensus documents. Then 
direcTORy authority sends the documents to each client. 
Clients build a network routing consists of three relays as 
displayed in Fig. 2, i.e., guard relay, middle relay, and exit 
relay. The relays selected according to flags sent by direcTORy 
authorities. 
B. Shadow 
Shadow is a discrete-event simulator built upon the 
distributed virtual network (DVN) simulator used to simulate 
TOR Project using shadow-plugin-TOR [4]. It can run on a 
host with average hardware requirements. TOR encapsulated in 
a plugin composed of application code and other functions to 
interact with TOR network. Every TOR condition loaded once 
in memory, and plugin registers all memory addresses for all 
TOR variables. Then Shadow manages each copy of memory 
area for each node in the simulations. Shadow loads plugin 
dynamically and run virtual node specified in simulation 
scripts. The communication between Shadow and plugin takes 
place through callback interface implemented by plugin. When 
it is executed, plugin running a non-blocking application. 
Hence events transferred within schedule using system calls 
intercepted by Shadow and directed to functions in node 
library. It integrates TOR to a simulation environment without 
TOR source code modifications. Every simulation run 
composed of processing stage which allows user access to 
Shadow commands to create plugins, to build and connect to 
networks, and to make nodes. Every event in simulation scripts 
created, and it starts until finished according to the schedule 
defined or timeout. 
III. EXPERIMENT SETUP 
One main criterion in this simulation is to provide insight 
about various combinations in size/number of relays and clients 
within a TOR network. Modelling a TOR network with 
different number of relays and clients is important, because 
small networks may not perform equally as large networks. 
Moreover, a diverse number of relays and clients can simulate 
privacy adjustment within a TOR network. 
After setting up TOR virtual networks within Shadow using 
shadow-plugin-TOR, twelve simulation configurations run 
with variety number of relays and clients. They are classified 
into three categories, i.e. first group for constant number of 
relay or client with configurations include 10r40c (10 relays 
and 40 clients), 10r80c, 10r120c, 40r10c, 80r10c, and 120r10c, 
second group for increasing number of relay or client 
gradually, i.e. 10r40c, 20r80c, 30r120c, 40r10c, 80r20c and 
120r30c, and third group with minimal number of relay or 
client configured with maximal number of relay or client, i.e. 
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10r40c, 40r10c, 40r120c, 120r40c. Each configuration run 
using “shadow-tor –w –y 3” command. 
A log created, named shadow.log, for each simulation 
run. It prints messages from all simulation processes. This log 
is used to check simulation result and TOR virtual networks 
performance. There are three main message functions in a log 
file, i.e. slave-heartbeat, torctl-message, and transfer-complete 
[4]. 
Slave-heartbeat function measures computer main memory 
(RAM) usage while running TOR virtual networks simulation. 
getrusage() function is used to get RAM usage in every 
second simulation. An example of a slave-heartbeat message is 
displayed in Fig. 3. 
Torctl-message in TOR library used to monitor and to 
connect TOR relays. It composed of bandwidth and connection 
scheme at network routing from each relay and client within 
TOR networks simulation. An example of a torctl-message is 
displayed in Fig. 4. 
Transfer-complete message is a traffic generaTOR (tgen) 
function used to monitor each connection built and measure 
data collection times from successful connections. Successful 
clients connected to a server have several data types. They are 
total-bytes-read as amount data downloaded, total-bytes-write 
as amount data uploaded, payload-bytes-read as total amount 
data collected from download and upload combination, msecs-
to-command as how long connection command is starting in 
millisecond, msecs-to-response as how long is connection 
response in millisecond, msecs-to-first-byte as how long is to 
get first byte data in millisecond, msecs-to-last-byte as how 
long is to get last byte data in millisecond, msecs-to-checksum 
as how long is to validate data acquired in millisecond. An 
example of a transfer-complete message is shown in Fig. 5. 
 
Fig. 3. A slave-heartbeat message in shadow.log. 
 
Fig. 4. A torctl-message in shadow.log. 
 
Fig. 5. A transfer-complete message in shadow.log. 
IV. EXPERIMENT RESULT 
All simulation results recorded in a shadow.log file are 
displayed in Table I, II, and III. Table I presents average and 
maximal CPU speed, and memory (RAM) usage from both 
dstat and getrusage() commands used in the simulations. 
Table II presents average transmission time for web-client, 
bulk-client, perf50kb, perf1mb, perf5mb. At last, Table III lists 
average bandwidth for relay, web-client, and bulk-client. 
Number of relays and client combinations chosen in these 
experiments are adjusted with computer resources available in 
the computer networks laboratory within faculty, i.e., Intel 
Dual Core CPU @ 2.4 GHz and 4 GB memory (RAM). From 4 
GB available in host, 2 GB used to set up a Linux Ubuntu guest 
where TOR network simulations can be run. 
TABLE I.  CPU SPEED AND RAM USAGE 
Number 
of relay 
Number 
of client 
Average 
CPU 
speed 
(%) 
Max. 
CPU 
speed 
(%) 
dstat 
(GiB) 
getrusage 
(GiB) 
10 40 44.02 59.6 0.286 0.321
10 80 43.53 74.5 0.56 0.53
10 120 45.76 74.25 0.786 0.734
20 80 39.71 74.31 0.762 0.708
30 120 39.47 74.44 0.881 0.9
40 10 34.9 60.55 0.333 0.326
40 120 40.7 73.87 0.975 0.909
80 10 42.46 66.33 0.669 0.695
80 20 38.5 74.25 0.75 0.728
120 10 44.08 73.94 1.091 1.054
120 30 40.92 74 1.469 1.493
120 40 46.67 74.5 1.262 1.326
 
The smallest configuration of 10 relays and 40 clients using 
60% from maximal CPU speed and approximately 350 MiB 
RAM. Meanwhile, for largest configuration with 120 relays 
and 30 clients using 74% from maximal CPU speed and 
approximately 1.5 GiB RAM. For configurations with fixed 10 
relays and increasing number of clients, i.e. 40, 80, and 120 the 
transmission time of web-clients are also increasing 181 s, 322 
s, and 438 s respectively. Meanwhile, for configurations with 
fixed 10 clients and increasing number of relays, i.e. 40, 80, 
and 120 the transmission time of web-clients are constant 
approximately 38 s. Bandwidth measurements for fixed 10 
relays and increasing number of clients are as follow, for 40 
clients bandwidth is 1.8 KB/s, for 80 clients bandwidth is 1 
KB/s, and for 120 clients bandwidth is 0.75 KB/s. Meanwhile, 
bandwidth measurements for fixed 10 clients and increasing 
number of relays are as follow, for 40 relays bandwidth is 8.5 
KB/s, for 80 relays bandwidth is 8.4 KB/s, and for 120 relays 
bandwidth is 8.9 KB/s. 
Total simulation time and maximal download time for three 
groups are presented in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 respectively. For the 
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first group, more number of relays decreases download time, 
but increases simulation time. Meanwhile for the second and 
third groups, the largest number of relays and clients produces 
smallest download time, but largest simulation time. Besides, 
moving average read time for three groups are illustrated in 
Fig. 8. 
TABLE II.  AVERAGE TRANSMISSION TIME (S) 
Num
ber 
of 
relay 
Num
ber of 
client 
Web-
client 
(327680 
byte) 
Bulk-
client 
(524288
0 byte) 
Perf-
50kb 
(51200 
byte) 
Perf-
1mb 
(104857
6 byte) 
Perf-
5mb 
(524288
0 byte) 
10 40 181.3 3045.9 116.3 487.4 1491
10 80 322.2 4268.2 182.4 674.5 2632.1
10 120 438.6 8433.3 294.6 1546.8 3425.6
20 80 51.2 217.9 65.2 123.1 346.9
30 120 50 253.2 71.6 163.1 335.3
40 10 38.2 83.9 55.3 94.7 187.8
40 120 46.5 98.9 61.7 114.2 248.8
80 10 38.8 85.4 54.5 87.1 159.2
80 20 38.6 165.4 56.9 91 212.4
120 10 36.5 53.1 53.7 85.5 153.3
120 30 41.3 106 55.9 89.2 241.1
120 40 39.5 67.1 55.9 87.6 210.5
TABLE III.  AVERAGE BANDWIDTH (KB/S) 
Number 
of relay 
Number 
of client Relay Web-client Bulk-client 
10 40 720.3 1.8 1.7
10 80 720.3 1 1.2
10 120 720.3 0.8 0.6
20 80 1021.9 6.4 24.1
30 120 1111.1 6.6 20.7
40 10 1233.8 8.6 62.5
40 120 1233.8 7.1 53
80 10 1460.6 8.4 61.4
80 20 1460.6 8.5 31.7
120 10 1116.8 9 98.8
120 30 1116.8 7.9 49.4
120 40 1116.8 8.3 78.1
 
 
Fig. 6. Total simulation time for three groups. 
 
Fig. 7. Maximal download time for three groups. 
 
Fig. 8. Moving average read time for three groups. 
V. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
From simulation results, variety number of relays and 
clients slightly affects maximum CPU speed. From Table I, 
the lowest max. CPU speed is 59.6%, while highest max. CPU 
speed is 74.5%. Hence, there is only 20% increasing max. 
CPU speed from all configurations tested. From Table I, same 
number of relays and increasing number of clients will add 
more memory usage, from 0.17 GiB to 0.5 GiB. Hence, 
number of clients more affecting memory usage rather than 
number of relays. 
From Table II, it can be seen that adding more relays may 
increase privacy or security level of data transmitted within 
TOR. It is caused by of more options of communication paths 
available for TOR. Moreover, Table II also presents faster 
packet transmission time with increasing number of relays. 
From Table III, it can be seen that more number of relays 
will increase average bandwidth. However, maximum average 
bandwidth is achieved when number of relays reaches 80. 
Then average bandwidth is slower again when number of 
relays reaches 120 equal to 30 relays used. Increasing number 
of client will also add average bandwidth, except an anomaly 
when number of relays reaches 120 and number of clients 
reaches 40. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The scalability of Shadow reduces TOR network 
complexity by running on a single moderate host with several 
assumptions. Small scale simulations with variety number of 
relays and clients have been conducted to examine TOR 
networks performance. This paper contributes in standardizing 
TOR measurements with two metrics, i.e., number of relays 
(nodes) and clients (users). 
More works required to compare this result with other TOR 
experimentation testbeds, e.g., ExperimenTor, SNEAC, TorPS, 
or COGS. In addition, several relevant metrics i.e., routing 
approach, topology, congestion, and adversaries can be used in 
performance comparison from those simulations. 
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